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HABERMAS, FREUD, ACCOUNTANTS: ENGAGING IN SELF-
DECEPTION AND/OR PUBLIC ABUSE?
ABSTRACT
In this paper I focus on Habermasian therapeutic
discourse, which, according to Habermas, is a pre-
requisite for transformation and emancipation. I
describe Habermas' reconstruction of Freudian
psychoanalysis, and subject it to critique by drawing
on several works, including some feminist authors. In
the second part of the paper, I draw parallels between
the power/knowledge construct of psychoanalysis and a
power/knowledge construct of financial accounting,
with particular reference to tax-effect accounting. I
conclude with a consideration of accountants as
reproducers of self-deception and generators of public
abuse.
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Sigmund Freud himself, as well as thousands of
his successors, explained to their patients why
those patients were doing, saying, feeling this
or that and the analysts were convinced that
they really knew the answers (Miller 1991 p 159
emphasis in original) .
For some time I have been struck, metaphorically
writing, by the similarities between some
psychotherapeutic discourses and financial accounting
as discourse. In this paper I attempt to expose this
in two steps. Firstly, I set out an exposition of
Habermasian writings in therapeutic discourses and
subject his dependence on Freud's works to critique.
In doing so, I illustrate the power/knowledge
construct of Habermasian therapeutic discourse.
Secondly, I illustrate one version of a
power/knowledge construct of financial reporting, that
is, tax-effect accounting. From this I consider
whether, and to what extent, accountants reproduce
self-deception. I then expose the way in which the
possibility of self-deception in a professional elite
can lead to public abuse.
Given that Habermas (1987 volume 1 p 21) made it clear
that therapeutic discourse was a necessary precursor
to practical discourse (see also Laughlin 1987 p 493),
it has considerable importance ln his theorising.
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Both therapeutic and practical discourse form the core
of the Habermasian process of enlightenment, and are
thus implicated in trans formative and emancipatory
processes which are informed by Habermasian thought.
Although some accounting researchers has used
Habermasian theorising to inform their work (see
Arrington & Puxty 1991, Broadbent, Laughlin & Read
1991, Dillard 1991, Power 1991) there lS little
recogni tion of this aspect, and thus, I claim this
paper as contributing to the development of
critical/postmodern studies in accounting (see Frank
1992 for an argument that Habermasian theorising has
postmodern elements) .
THERAPEUTIC DISCOURSE:
Habermas referred to therapeutic critique as the
discourse which "seeks to clarify systematic self-
deception II (1987 volume 1 p 21). It is obvious that
Habermas had drawn on Freudian thought for this
process (see Hall & Lindzey 1978 pp 31 74 for a
brief uncritical discussion of Freud's work), and this
caused me considerable tension. As an undergraduate,
I had studied some of Freud I s works. When I first
started reading Habermas's writings in depth, I
recalled a paper which suggested that maybe the
Oedipus complex was merely a proj ection of Freud 's.
In the Freudian sense, a projection is a defence
5
mechanism, whereby one attributes the source of moral
or neurotic anxiety to the external world, rather than
to one's own primitive impulses or threats of
conscience (see Hall & Lindzey 1978 pp 52 53) .
Thus, the suggestion of proj ection called into
question the appropriateness of generalising the
Oedipus complex as part of a crucial stage in the
development of all humans. My long-held questioning
of Freud's work was reinforced by a later awareness of
the critique of the power reinforcement inherent In
Freudian thought and psychoanalytic therapy (see for
example Masson 1990). Linking this with an awareness
that feminist critiques of Freud existed (see for
example Mitchell 1974, Eisenstein 1984, Irigaray 1985a
and 1985b, Griffiths & Whitford (eds) 1990, Dallery
1990 and Elliot 1992), it is not surprising that I was
somewhat wary of this Habermasian therapeutic
discourse. This was notwithstanding Hall & Lindzey's
claim, that much of the criticism of Freud's work "was
scarcely more than the sound and fury of overwrought
people" (1978 p 66). I partially resolved my warlness
through deciding to critique Freudian thought in
Habermas's work.
Habermas & Freud:
Habermas claimed Freudian psychoanalysis as an
"example of critical theory" (1974 p xii), and an
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"important place as an example" (1978 p vii).
However, he appeared to qualify his understanding of
Freud by noting:
It seems to me necessary to state that my
acquaintance with it is limited to the study of
Freud's writings. I cannot draw upon the
practical experiences of an analysis. (Habermas
1978 p vii)
This caveat may have been used to forestall criticism
of his interpretation, which, according to Ottmann was
"exceedingly intellectualised" (1982 p 86).
Habermas claimed Freud's work as critical theory
because it went beyond a purely "verstehenden"
explication of meaning. Further, Habermas claimed
Freud's work as a theory of systematically distorted
communication (1974 p xii) The descriptions Habermas
used to describe Freudian psychoanalysis indicate that
the distortion arises within the subject of analysis.
For example, Habermas claimed the psychoanalytic
interpretation is concerned with those connections of
sYmbols "in which a subject deceives itself about
itself" (1978 p 218).
•
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In writing about adult education and discussing
Habermas I s ideas about psychoanalysis, Mezirow noted
that psychoanalytic therapy is sometimes used to
help the patient understand the true reasons for
the behavior in question and motives for
acquiring such a response pattern. (Mezirow 1985
p 146)
Attention is drawn to the use of the word II true II in
the above quote, and, for the moment, critique 1S
suspended to explore further exposition from the
literature. Breda & Feinberg noted Habermas I s re-
interpretation of psychoanalysis:
wherein the initial encounter between the client
and the therapist the client narrates his {sic}
past history within a causal, deterministic
ideology. Communicative distortion at this level
is considered an terms of a divergence between
motives and intentions, where the latter are
considered to be conSC10US. When people
systematically act in ways that are inconsistent
with their intentions, they may be said to have a
distorted self-understanding. The role of the
therapist is to facilitate the overcoming of this
distortion. (Bredo & Feinberg 1982a p 279)
8
Before moving into the role of the analyst, a further
description from Schrag posits Habermas's
interpretation of the unconscious as "a distortion of
dialogue issuing from disturbances .in discourse and
action" (1986 p 174). Dickens, (and see also Elliot
1992 p 109) offered a summary:
Freud's work, as Habermas sees it, involves both
understanding and causal explanation. As a
theory of distorted communication, psychoanalysis
involves both a hermeneutic explication of the
actor-patient's subjective viewpoint and
explanatory hypotheses concerning symbolic
structures which lie beyond the actor-patient I s
immediate view. The lat ter hypotheses refer to
the hidden influences of repressed motives.
The development of explanatory hypotheses which
account for the distorted communication are of
course based on certain theoret ical assumptions,
and Freud's limitation is that these claims are
not fully developed in his work.
144)
(Dickens 1983 p
And so, what is the role of the analyst? Returning to
Habermas I who drew on the Freudian "dreamwork" I the
analyst must "penetrate behind the manifest content of
the dream text in order to grasp the latent dream
_____________________J.
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thought which it expresses" (Habermas 1978 p 221). As
Thompson noted:
Psychoanalysis assumes that the occurrence of an
unbearable conflict is followed by the exclusion
of the relevant object from public communication,
creating a gap in the semantic field which lS
filled by a privatised symbol. The latter
appears as a symptom which deviates from the
rules of ordinary language, remaining
unintelligible until its genesls has been
reconstructed and explained. (Thompson 1981 P
133)
But Habermas identified a difference between the role
of an analyst and a mere interpreter. An analyst is
"one who teaches one and the same subj ect to
comprehend his own language" (Habermas 1978 p 228).
Somewhat paradoxically, Habermas noted, later In the
same text, that the analyst lS the "instrument of
knowledge" (1978 p 237). It seems obvious that the
teaching of comprehension does involve the analyst in
theoretical interpretation, or as Thompson put it:
By accepting the theoretically mediated account
of the analyst, the patient confirms an
interpretation and simultaneously sees through a
self-deception. (Thompson 1981 p 95)
L _
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Further, he noted that "the ultimate criterion of
verification is the patient's act of recollection"
(Thompson 1981 p 106). To emphasize the process,
Habermas noted:
The {physician} reconstructs what has been
forgotten from the faulty texts of the {patient},
from his dreams, associations, and repetitions,
thebyanimated
by the physician as
Only the patient's
the accuracy of the







Thompson clearly saw this accuracy criterion as
problematic:
It is a peculiar characteristic of psychoanalysis
that the repression of the contents of the
unconscious is overcome by the subject's eventual
acceptance of the analyst's interpretation.
(Thompson 1981 p 135)
At the same time he noted that
h
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Wittgenstein notes with apparent approval that
Freud provides a completely new account of
'correct explanation': 'not one agreeing with
experience, but one accepted'. (Thompson 1981 p
186)
Thus "acceptance" of an interpretation




The adequacy of the interpretation is confirmed
by its corning to be recognised and accepted by
the patient in his or her self-reflection on the
original episode, and by the patient I s ability,
on the basis of this recognition, to overcome the
SYmptomatic behaviour. (Moon 1983 p 175)
However, this 1S a drastic over-simplification of the
process. As Habermas noted, both the patient's
acceptance and/or rejection of the analyst's
reconstructions, can be seen by an analyst to be
neither legitimate assent nor "legitimate dissent"
(1978 pp 267 269) . In other words, the analyst
decides the accuracy. This, .in turn, is linked to
self-reflection. According to Habermas,
psychoanalytic hermeneutics do not aim at
the unders tanding of symbolic structures
12
in
general. Rather, the act of understanding to
which it leads is self-reflection.
1978 P 228 emphases in original)
(Habermas
According to Habermas, the assumptions In
psychoanalytic theory promoted the reconstruction of
individual life histories (1974 p xiii). But he
claimed that psychoanalysis is a theory of
systematically distorted communication, and as such,
"necessarily presupposed a general theory of
(nondistorted) communication" (1974 p xvii) .
Habermas claimed this because the reconstruction
"essentially anticipates the {patient's} own
reflective appropriation of this story" (1974 p xiii) .
Thus, self-reflection for Habermas, In his re-
interpretation of Freudian thought was
the assertion that the process of knowledge
induced In the patient by the physician is to
comprehended as self-reflection.
p 232)
This is further explained:
(Habermas 1978
Analysis has immediate therapeutic results
because the critical overcoming of blocks to
-
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consciousness and the penetration of false
objectivations initiates the appropriation of a
lost portion of life history i it thus reverses
the process of splitting-off. That lS why
analytic knowledge is self-reflection. (Habermas
1978 p 233)
Although as Geuss (1981 pp 55-75) and Bubner (1982 pp
44 47) noted, for Habermas, self-reflection was
quite complicated, as well as being considerably
different from other interpretations in the Frankfurt
School tradition.
According to Thompson, Habermas regarded
psychoanalysis as a "type of depth hermeneutics which
incorporates explanation and understanding into a
science oriented towards methodical self-reflection"
(1981 p 83). Thus, in this self reflection, according
to Thompson's understanding of Habermas's
reconstruction, "the subject overcomes an illusion and
is thereby freed from dependence upon reified
relations of power" (1981 p 84). It is important to
note that these power relations, in Habermas ' s
reconstruction of Freudian thought, reside In the
subject and are between repressed motives and
conscious behaviour. Habermas noted that he was
making "defense mechanisms comprehensible as inner-
14
psychic communication disturbances" (1985 P 212). As
Elliot put it:
Habermas reconstructs the unconscious/conscious
dualism as an embodiment of systematically
distorted communication. In this communications
reading of Freud, consciousness contains the
discourses of the public sphere, while the
unconscious contains those needs and desires that
are prevented or denied access to communicative
action. (Elliot 1992 p 106 emphases in original)
Habermas did recognise the importance of the training
of the analyst. As he noted, analysts must undergo
considerable training, so that they do not simply
"proj ect onto the patient their proj ection II (Habermas
1978 p 236.) In summary, according to Habermas,
psychoanalysis
represents a science employing, for the first
time, methodological self-reflexion; and that, in
this instance, self-reflexion means the
disclosure and analytical negation of
unconsciously motivated compulsive behaviour and
of limits to perceptions tending to function like











formulation of critical theorems in the first stage of
Habermas's transformative processes.





There are several aspects of
interpretation which need addressing.
from an absence of the critique of
relationship between the analyst and the





"gender-blindness", and as Laughlin pointed out,
Habermas was silent on the processes which lead the
'patient' to seek out therapy in the first place (1987
p 499). However, Habermas did give some indication of
a precipitating event:
It takes an earthquake to make us aware that we
had regarded the ground on which we stand
everyday as unshakeable. (Habermas 1987 volume 2
p 400)
Habermas's labelling of the outcome of the
psychoanalytic therapy as self-reflection diminishes
the possibility of emancipatory self-reflection
undertaken alone, essentially as a private exercise
(see Ernst & Goodison 1981 and Mindell 1990 for
L _
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examples of suggested liberating processes for working
on one's self, alone). Although, it is possible that
Habermas focused on psychoanalysis in the therapeutic
discourse stage rather than in the "monological mock
dialogue", because of the differing constituents of
theoretical and therapeutic discourse. In other
words, was Habermas assuming that participants in the
theoretical discourse, the researchers, did not
require therapeutic discourse, and that the researched
did?
Habermas did recognise that in "analytic dialogue the
roles are asymmetrically distributed" (1987 volume 1 p
21). However, he then completed the sentence with the
following: "the analyst and the patient do not behave
like proponent and opponent" (Habermas 1987 volume 1 p
21) . The first part of the sentence appears to
acknowledge a power differential, and then the
completion of the sentence seems to de-emphasize this
power differential. In a discussion of Habermas's re-
construction, Weber noted that:
In the asymmetrical therapeutic dialogue the
self-reflective capacities of one member {that
is, the analyst} are applied to the communication
of the other within the context of a dialogue, so
that the person {that is, the 'patient'} whose
distorted communication is the object of the
therapy is restored to full subject-hood.
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Thus
in each case an intervention of reflection
results in the restoration of autonomy.
1976 p 101)
(Weber
Again there is no recognition of the power
differential in the relationship between analyst and
analysand. Dorothy Rowe, a practicing non-Freudian
psychotherapist, focussed on the power relationship In
Freudian psychoanalysis: "the psychotherapist lS
superior, the patient inferior" (in a forward to
Masson 1990 p 13). Timpanaro claimed that the patient
was always inferior, irrespective of whether there was
acceptance or denial of the analyst's interpretation
(1985 p 59). This was because the patient was unable
to advance and defend an alternative explanation. The
superior/inferior dichotomy is not a misreading of
Freud as Masson, quoting Freud, noted
Freud, in "On the History of the Psycho-analytic
Movement" wrote that analysis is a 'situation in
which there is a superior and a subordinate I •
(Masson 1990 P 41)
One might be forgiven for naively thinking that the
'helper' was subordinate to the 'helped', but of
course, Freud was clearly not of this persuasion (see




discussion of the manipulation involved in the coerced
consent of the patient). As Rowe noted:
The {Freudian} psychotherapist, by virtue of his
{sic} knowledge, training, and special insight
has access to truth above and beyond the capacity
of the patients. The psychotherapist I s truths
have a higher truth value than the patient's
truths. The psychotherapist interprets the
patient I s truths and tells him {sic} what they
really mean. (in Masson 1990 p 13 emphasis an
original)
Rowe described power as the "right to have your
definition of reality prevail over all other people's
definition of reality" (in Masson 1990 p 16).
Further, Rowe also noted that people who believe that
they know what is best for other people are "denying
other people's truths" (p 17). (see Miller, a former
Freudian psychotherapist, who argued cogently that
knowledge of childhood injury has been banished by
Freudian reconstruction of reality. In a series of
publications Miller 1987 a and b, 1991 and 1992 argued
that this banishment accounts for the violence people
perpetrate on one another.) Masson claimed that a
Freudian psychotherapist is engaged in a process which
is "bound to diminish the dignity, autonomy, and
_________________J
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freedom of the person who comes for help" (1990 p 24).
In discussing his Freudian training, Masson disclosed:
I was taught during my psychotherapeutic training
that statements about relationships should always
be regarded as no more than an account of wishes,
fantasies, desires, and projections. They could
not be taken at face value.
According to him:
(Masson 1990 p 24)
In therapy, the person I s account of a traumatic
event is not to be taken literally, as referring
to something real that happened in the real
world. (Masson 1990 p 25)
This is not just unsubstantiated assertion on Masson's
part, but 1S justified by his study, not only of
Freud I s theoretical works, but also of his extensive
clinical description of Dora, Freud I s famous patient.
An example,
compelling:
in an unavoidably long quotation, is
Freud had never believed that Dora could be
concerned with external truth. When he said
"early in the case, that she was almost beside
herself at the idea of its being supposed that




occasion", he went on to say: "For a long time I
was In perplexity as to what the self-reproach
could be which lay behind her passionate
repudiation of this explanation of the episode"
(S. E., 7: 46) . In other words, Freud did not
believe that Dora had a legitimate concern with
historical truth; it must be neurotic, serving a
defense function. In this case Freud believed
she was merely deluded: it was an internal
pretence. Freud's interpretations of Dora's
behaviour (most of them made, let us remember,
directly to her) were in the service of
disavowing the apparent reality in favour of his
deeper reality. Not only did this corne to take
on an automatic quality (the fate it was
invariably to suffer at the hands of lesser
intellects), but it was patently false in many
instances. (Masson 1990 p 96)
This, according to Masson,
Freudian analysis:
lS echoed throughout
In any disagreement between the patient and the
therapist, it is assumed that the therapist is
more likely to be right (more objective, more
disinterested, more knowledgeable, more
experienced in interpreting human behaviour) than
is the patient. (Masson 1990 p 42)
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In summary, Masson noted that the tools of the
profession of psychotherapy are
insight and interpretations. But one person I s
insight is another's nonsense. (Masson 1990 p
46) [2]
Weber noted that Habermas explicated self-reflection
in terms of therapeutic dialogue, rather than ln terms
of the activity of critical theorists (1976 p 100).
Habermas claimed that "the presuppositions of
discourse can be satisfied only after the therapy has
been successful" (1987 p 21). But what is success?
As Rowe noted, Freudian psychotherapy is not concerned
with cure: "psychiatrists talk of not curing patients,
but of 'managing' them" (in Masson 1990 p 10)
Whitebook argued that Habermas's re-interpretation
destroyed the essence of Freud's theorising,
primarily, but not exclusively, because of the
Habermasian communicative construction of needs, and
the rej ection of unconscious drives (1985 pp 155
157) . Of course, this privileged Freud as being the
bench mark, and this is confirmed by Habermas who
noted that Whitebook retained "a more or less orthodox
interpretation" (1985 p 211). However, Habermas
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rejected all of Whitebook's criticism (1985 pp 211-
214) .
In the postscript to II Knowledge & Human Interests II ,
appended to the second edition, Habermas reflected on
some potentially confusing aspects of his earlier work
(1978 pp 377 - 380) He claimed that the earlier work
lacked precision, and sought to remedy this by
elucidating the differences between self-criticism
(sometimes referred to self-reflection) and rational
re-constructions. Habermas claimed that these
differences could be identified in the following three
aspects. I decided it was necessary to cite these in
full, because of my difficulties with them. The three
aspects were:
(a) Criticism is brought to bear on objects of
experience whose pseudo-objectivity is to be
revealed, whereas reconstructions are based on
'objective' data like sentences, actions,
cognitive insights, etc., which are conscious
creations of the subject from the very beginning
(b) Criticism is brought to bear on something
particular concretely speaking, on the
particular self-formative process of an ego, or
group, identity - whereas reconstructions try to
understand anonymous systems of rules which can
23
be followed by any subject at all provided it has
the requisite competences.
(c) Criticism is characterized by its ability to
make unconscious elements conscious In a way
which has practical consequences. Criticism
changes the determinants of false consciousness,
whereas reconstructions explicate correct
knowledge, i.e., the intuitive knowledge we
acquire when we possess rule-competence, without
involving practical consequences. (Habermas 1978
p 378 emphases in original)
With (al above, I am not at all clear on what lS the
difference between "objects of experience" and
"actions". The ontological differences between
"objects of experience" and "actions", particularly
from a constructivist viewpoint, are negligible.
Perhaps, then, this is a point at which Habermas 's
realist position is more noticeable. Further, I
cannot understand the claim to the uniquely conscious
nature of reconstructions. Does this confirm
Habermas's explication of the Freudian unconscious In
systematically distorted communication within an
individual, and deny that reconstructions are made by
individuals?
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with (b) above, again the difference remains opaque to
me. The first part appears to fit quite well with the
interpretation of needs in a Habermasian sense, so why
would Habermas reject this, as part of a
reconstruction? Does the anonymous system of rules
imply generalisable interests, and hence can be
differentiated from the interests or need
interpretations of particular communities?
with (c) above, I wonder: was Habermas referring to
the immanence of undistorted communication? Is there
not an assumption ln criticism based on the same
immanence, but belonging, r n this case, to the pre-
supposed knowledge of the analyst? What impact does
the suspension of "practical consequences" have for
the ideal speech situation,






According to Dickens, the Habermasian reflection is
concerned with the "act of gaining consciousness of
identity-forming processes" in individuals (1983 p
154). He claimed reconstruction simply referred "to a
similar process at the societal level" (Dickens 1983 p
154) . This is similar to the difference noted by
Ottmann (1982 p 84), and one that seems obvious; but
Thompson (1982 p 118) noted they were not "unrelated".
but the reality which
reality that must be
radical social reform.
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If this lS the case, why was Habermas concerned at
differentiating the two, as outlined above?
Feminist critiques of Freud:
Turning now to feminist critiques of Freud and
Habermas I s re-interpretation of Freud, Eisenstein
focussed generally on the role of Freudian
psychoanalysis in the web of power of patriarchy (1984
pp 72-73). Reactions to such a role have been widely
diversified, as Young-Bruehl noted:
On the one hand, the fact that psychoanalytic
theory is obviously not an equal-opportunity
theory has meant for some that it should be
rejected or radically cleansed of its bias
against women. On the other hand, the
psychoanalytic portrait of the female as a failed
male has been accepted as the deepest analysis
available of the effects of patriarchy (or the
nuclear family as the carrier of patriarchy) on
men's attitudes toward women and women's
attitudes toward themselves. Here it is not the
view that is objected to,
the Vlew reflects, the
addressed by any truly
(Young-Bruehl 1990 p 41)
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Habermas has certainly acknowledged the feminist
movement as an example of a movement as an
emancipatory potential (1987 volume 2 pp 393-394). As
he noted:
the struggle against patriarchal oppression and
for the redemption of a promise that has long
been anchored in the acknowledged universalistic
foundations of morality and law q i.ve s feminism
the impetus of an offensive movement. (Habermas
1987 volume 2 p 393)
However, In the latter part of the above quote, Young-
Bruehl (1990) is clearly referring to the famous work
of Luce Irigaray who used Freudian psychoanalytic
theorising to critique psychoanalysis, and rationality
(see Whitford 1988 pp 109 - 130 for a lucid summary).
A recent article by Shearer & Arrington (1993) used
the work of Irigaray to illustrate the dominance of
accounting's relation to value, to subjectivity, to
intersubjectivity and to sexuality, and I will return
to this later. For now, I wish to focus on Irigaray's
critique. According to Whitford:
For Irigaray the conceptualisation of rationality
is inseparable from the conceptualisation of
sexual difference. The scission of epistemology
from its sources lS linked to a model of
...
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rationality (symbolised as male) In which the
symbolic female is dominated or repressed, and
I transcended I • Irigaray suggests that this has
led to the apotheosis of rationality modern
technology. (Whitford 1988 p 124)
Further, Whitford noted that:
What is important is that rationality is
categorised by Irigaray as male, not in order to
oppose it, which would be self-defeating, but In
order to suggest a more adequate
conceptualisation, in which, In psychoanalytic
terms, the male does not repress or split off the
female/unconscious, but acknowledges or
integrates it. (1988 p 125)
In an interview with translators/editors, Irigaray, In
responding to a question by the editors as to why she
undertook her critique of Freud, claimed:
Because in the process of elaborating a theory of
sexuality, Freud brought to light something that
had been operative all along although it remained
implicit, hidden, unknown: the sexual
indifference that underlies the truth of any
science, the logic of every discourse. This is
readily apparent in the way Freud defines female
28
sexuality. In fact, this sexuality is never
defined with respect to any sex but the
masculine. Freud does not see two sexes whose
differences are articulated in the act of
intercourse, and, more generally speaking, in the
imaginary and symbolic processes that regulate
the workings of society and a culture. The
"feminine" lS always described in terms of
deficiency or atrophy, as the other side of the
sex that alone holds a monopoly on value: the
male sex. (Irigaray 1985b p 69 emphases in
original)
Irigaray has an explicit agenda for feminism:
It lS not a matter of toppling that
{phallocratic} order so as to replace it - that
amounts to the same thing in the end - but of
disrupting it and modifying it, starting from an
"outside" that is exempt, in part, from
phallocratic law. (1985b p 68)
Here Irigaray is acknowledging that some feminist
scholars were being accused of seeking to oppose
patriarchy by promoting matriarchy (see Eisenstein
1984) . Froula saw these accusations as an expression
of men's fear:
29
Men very commonly express the fear that feminist
criticism will invert the hierarchy in which they
have invested so much will, in other words,
silence them as patriarchal discourse has
silenced women. (Froula 1984 p 178 emphasis in
original)
Irigaray urged feminists to "pry out what was borrowed
from the feminine and give back what is owed to the
feminine" (1985b p 74). Heilbrun used a musical
metaphor:
Women do not ask for a new harmony with the major
theme always in the soprano range, but for
counterpoint. (Heilbrun 1990 p 31)
Irigaray suggested the use of mimesis as a means of
reclamation:
One must assume the feminine role deliberately.
Which means already to convert a form of
subordination into an affirmation, and thus to
begin to thwart it. To play with mimesis is
thus, for a woman, to try and recover the place
of her exploitation by discourse, without
allowing herself to be simply reduced by it. It
is possible to ... mimic ideas about herself that
are elaborated in/by a masculine logic, to make
30
visible what was supposed to remain invisible.
(Irigaray 1985b p 76)





It can be seen that the power/knowledge construct 1S
one in which knowledge 1S created through the powerful
interventions of the analyst. At the same time,
although Habermas recognised the feminist movement as
potentially emancipatory, he appeared to have adopted
a gender-silenced approach to his use of Freud (1987
volume 2 pp 393-394) He de-emphasized the power
differential inherent 1n Freudian psychoanalysis, and
supported its realist ontological assumptions.
Habermas was silent on the point that maybe some, or
all, of Freud I s work was merely his proj ections onto
his clinical patients, the origins of his theorising.
Further, as Laughlin noted, Habermas was silent on the
means of persuading or encouraging anyone to engage in
self-reflection (1987 p 499). I mean r n this
instance, not only the self-reflection supposedly
gained from Freudian psychoanalysis, but also, self-
reflection essentially as a private exercise
undertaken alone. Of course, I do not mean to imply
that such self-reflection is not socially constructed
...
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(see Day, Kaidonis & Perrin, 1993, for an account of
the use of self-reflective journals in the teaching of
accounting theory). Nevertheless the question of
encouragement remains open.
To reiterate, Habermas claimed that successful therapy
was a prerequisite for practical discourse. This is
clearly problematic. In his use of Freudian thought,
Habermas also adopted a realist ontological position,
which is not unconnected to Habermas' s links to the
tradition of a claimed "false consciousness" or
illusion (see Guba 1990 p 24) .
A Power/knowledge Construct ~n Financial Reporting
One of the roles of financial accountants/auditors is
the construction of a true profit for a period. These
professional elite have the power to tell 'the real
story I of any organisation I s financial affairs.
Accountants and auditors, like analysts, believe they
know the answers. Here I briefly recount I the real
story I accountants tell, and auditors confirm, about
taxation in financial reporting. Many textbooks on
advanced financial accounting would concisely
elucidate the practice (for one example see Henderson
& Pierson 1993). My recounting here is brief because
the practice will be familiar to many readers; indeed
-
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it is its very familiarity\reality\enchantment which I
wish to address. According to Cotton
The enchanting effect of language exemplifies the
way cultural objects may escape the social
conditions of their meaning and appear
authoritatively natural, transcendent, magical,
or even professional. (Cotton 1985 p 575)
The taxation expense for a period lS not necessarily,
directly, connected to the amount of tax paid/payable
for a period. Because of differences in the rules for
determining assessible income and recognising revenue,
and for calculating allowable deductions and
recognising expenses, the taxation expense is diferent
from the amount of taxation actually due to the
taxation authorities. These differences are
I accounted for I through the use of an asset, termed
future tax benefit and through the use of a liability,
termed deferred income tax or something similar. This
method of tax-effect accounting is generally said to
be in accordance with the matching principle
(Henderson & Pierson 1993) .
What is the story being told in tax-effect accounting?
Assets, such as future benefi t s , are internally
constructed and have no value to any party outside the
organisation; assets which can never be
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sold.
Liabilities, such as deferred tax provisions, are
internally constructed and there is no debt to any
outside parties. Isn't this curious? Doesn't it seem
illusory? Isn't it deceptive?
I do believe this is deceptive: assets which aren't
'really' assets and liabilities which aren't 'really'
liabilities in 'commonsense' meanings of the words!
But who is deceiving whom?
My belief that this practice 1S deceptive has
developed from two sources. One 1S my teaching
experience (see Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule
1987, Benhabib & Cornell (eds) 1987, Jaggar & Bordo
(eds) 1989, Smith 1991, and Kreiger 1992 for primarily
feminist arguments for using one's own experiences as
sources of knowledge) and I have been teaching a
variety of students from some years; these include
university accountancy students as well as MBA
students, as well as employees in a large Australian
company. It 1S particularly noticeable that the
latter two groups invariably believe that the after-
tax profit for the period is profit remaining after
the tax due to the taxation authorities has been paid.
Well, yes, it is logical to think this ...
-
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The second source of my belief about this practice as
deceptive is the increasing emphasis in some areas of
accounting literature (see Cooper & Hopper (eds) 1990
and issues of Accounting, Organizations and Society,
Advances in Public Interest in Accounting, Auditing,
Accounting and Accountability Journal, and Critical
Pespectives on Accounting I am following Willmott,
Puxty & Sikka, 1993 here and not specifically
identifying all the individual authors, although they
are included in the list of references) about the
professionalism, or rather the claims to
professionalism, of accountants. A recurrent theme in
this literature is the power vested in
accountants/auditors (see particularly Sikka, Willmott
& Lowe 1989 and 1991, Willmott 1991 and Cousins &
Sikka 1993). Reflecting on this power dimension added
to my belief that the practice of tax-effect
accounting, ln the manner described above, is
deceptive (see Covaleski & Dirsmith 1990 for one of
the very few references to reflection in accounting
literature) .
In the example of tax-effect accounting,
accountants/auditors have the power to reconstruct
something quite simple into something complex,
unintelligible to the uninitiated, or worse still,
misleading to the uninitiated. I do believe that
there is a simple means of accounting for income tax:
..
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a journal entry debiting as taxation expense and
crediting provision for taxation the amount due and
payable to taxation authorities for the taxation
period concerned. This is clearly a measure of my
I resistance I .i.n Freudian terms, to the I better
knowledge' of accountants.
It's ironic that, because of the internally
constructed nature of the resultant assets and
liabilities of tax-effect accounting, accountants are
breaking their own rules about recording transactions
not with outside parties. Do accountants/auditors
actually believe their own constructions? Is it
possible that they may not only be deceiving
outsiders, like the students mentioned above, but are
also deceiving themselves?
Perhaps accountants/auditors have the intention to
make the outcomes of their practices understandable,
but, in the case of tax-effect accounting, the outcome
is, apparently, inconsistent with such an intention.
According to Bredo & Feinberg's (1982a) commentary
noted above, this probably constitutes self-deception
in Habermasian terms.
using a parallel with psychoanalysis, (rather than the
psycholinguistic approach used by Adelberg & Farelly,
1989), the simple means of accounting for income tax I
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proposed above, remains unintelligible until it is
explained by my 'resistance'. Only after I believe
the experts\analysts\accountants\auditors, and perhaps
not even then (Habermas 1978 pp 267-269), can I
overcome my illusions (Thompson 1981), and, in Weber's
(1976) terms, be restored to full autonomy.
Shearer and Arrington, drawing on Irigaray I s (1985b)
feminist critique of Freud, suggested that economists
are engaging in transference, that lS, projecting
their own lack onto others (1993 P 269). Could not
the same be said for accountants\auditors? What
repressed motives could 'account' for accounting for
income tax?
Public Abuse?
It lS arguable that self-deception 1S just a private
matter, and has little place .in the public domain.
However, just when does the possiblity of the
'private' self-deception of accountants\auditors
become linked to the possibility of public abuse?
What is private and what is public has been subjected
to considerable criticism within feminist literature
(see, for example Fraser's (1987) critique of the
private/public dimensions of Habermasian theorising).
Linking this feminist concern with the considerable
body of literature regarding the pursuit of public
...
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interest (see particularly Arrington 1990), I have
little hesitation in suggesting that there is indeed
the possibility of public abuse. I am using the term
'public abuse' here In a way similar to Mindell
(1982, 1985 and forthcoming), that is, the existence
of a culturally sanctioned repression of a certain
group (Mindell uses 'attack' rather than repression).
It lS characterised by unconscious privilege of those
in authority, systematic suppression of those under-
represented in decision-making, and there is a
I public' pseudo-consensus that I it is ok'. I believe
there is a possibility of public abuse generally with
financial reporting, In that I suspect that many
accountants are unaware of their power/authority to
construct 'assets I and I liabilities' (are self-
deceptive, perhaps?), and that those who are affected
by accounting numbers are silenced because of the
prevalence of the rhetorical claim that users of
financial information are the audience being reported
to. I know that there is a small section of the
academic accounting community who clearly believe that
accounting 'is not ok' (see particularly Willmott,
Puxty and Sikka 1993), but I do not believe that this
has sufficient authority to overturn the pseudo-















accounting for income tax, as described above, is that
the amount of taxation payable by corporations to the
taxation authorities of the State, in anyone period
is distorted. { {I will check the extent of this for
some top Australian companies '" I do recall that the
amount of tax paid by Australian companies is quite
low, although the rate is quite high}}. Lf , because
of the method of accounting for income tax, the public
believe that corporations are paying considerably more
tax than they, in fact, are, is this not public abuse?
A second dimension of public abuse is one that relates
to my teaching of tax-effect accounting. I echo
Francis (1990) who mentioned his continually being
more or less troubled by his teaching of accounting
(see also Sikka 1987, Booth & Cocks 1990, Power 1991).
Am I sufficiently aware of my power as a teacher? To
what extent do I silence students through my teaching
processes and what I teach? Am I being abusive to
accounting students, if I don I t teaching tax-effect
accounting from both critical and cynical viewpoints?
Am I being abusive if I do?
ENDNOTES:
[1] I have used the term analysand here to reflect my
personal preference.
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[2] It lS important to note that as well as being
extremely critical of Freudian psychoanalysis, Masson
(1990) was also critical of all psychotherapy.
However, while I am uncomfortable with certain aspects
of Freudian psychoanalysis, I acknowledge his
contribution to our knowing about ourselves. I
believe that some therapy, for example body jprocess
work by Mindell (1985) may be appropriate for some
people, at some times, in their lives. In Mindell's
(1985) ideal, the therapist and client work together
in a co-operative process in order to secure a better
Li.fe for the client. In this work, the therapist
draws on the experience of his or her feelings, in the
sense outlined by Griffiths (1988) Further, the
prescribed linkages of theories of the body,
tradition, force and reflexivity outlined by Fay
(1987), seem to fit quite well with Mindell's work.
Because of the potential link between therapy and play
(see Bateson 1982), and hence emancipation, therapies
such as sandplay therapy (for examples, see Kalff
1980, Bradway 1990 and Ryce-Menuhin 1992) may also be
effective.
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